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name else Micha Gisser University of New Mexico This study is concerned with the combination of target price and acreage controls as the two major mechanisms of farm policy.Acre- age controls are shown to enhance the efficiency of redistribution under a target price program.The study proves that if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs is less than one, then the income redistribu- tional costs are likely to be reduced All such theses must be typed in double spacing on one side of quarto or A4 paper with the notes and references at the foot of each page. No thesis offered above   The 'outline' papers are in British and General History: unless you substitute a thesis for one of them. but all periods are studied at greater depth. Chapter 3  .The study proves that if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs is less than one, then the income redistribu- tional costs are likely to be reduced.

Moreover, by using an empirical estimate of the elasticity of substitution and farm data for the time period 1984-88, this study demonstrates that acreage control pro- grams have drastically reduced the deadweight losses associated with income redistribution flowing from target price programs.

These results lend strong support to the public choice notion that politi- cians favor efficient redistribution schemes.Introduction Most economists have by now abandoned the belief that the main purpose of regulation is to correct for failures of private markets   0.6 https://docmh.com/dap-an-de-thi-toan-vao-10-2013-ha-noi-SnQeK3v 2017-03-27 monthly 0.6 https://docmh.com/believe-the-film-website-terms-of-use-pdf   0.6 https://docmh.com/case-5-13-cv-document-1-filed-11-07-13-page-1-of-15-pageid-1-united-states-district-court-western-district-of-louisiana-pdf 2017-03-27  .Introduction Most economists have by now abandoned the belief that the main purpose of regulation is to correct for failures of private markets.Even environmental regulation no longer rests solely on the theory of externalities; rent-seeking groups have influenced its nature, if not I am indebted to an anonymous reader, Orville A.

Overboe, Darryl Chodorow, Yujiro Hayami, Toshihiko Kawagoe, Vernon M'.

Ruttan, John Rosine, Peter Helm- berger, Peter Gregory, David Dietz, and Tom Brill.Helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper were received from participants in seminars at Ball State University, University of Houston, and University of New Mexico.farm commodities program is no exception since it is designed to transfer income from taxpayers, and sometimes from consumers, to farmers.Agricultural economists have wondered why some commodities (e., eggs and vegetables) are supported; or why, over time, the government support for some goods (e., peanuts) has increased, while for others (e.Peltzman's (1976) theory of regula- tion provides general theoretical answers to these questions as well as a variety of possible testable implications.Gardner (1987) was able to confirm Peltzman's general theory of regulation by regressing pro- ducer gains from farm programs on typical "public choice" variables.By using pooled data extending from 1912 to 1980, he explained the nature of the political forces that determined the selection of agricultural commodities to be included in the farm programs, as well as the level of support applied to each commodity.Becker (1983) analyzed the effect of deadweight costs on the com- petition for political influence.

He concluded, among other things, that "deadweight costs stimulate efforts by taxed groups to lower taxes, but discourage efforts by subsidized groups to raise subsidies" (p.That is, by reducing deadweight costs associated with eco- nomic distribution, subsidized groups can raise their subsidies.Con- trary to economists who tend to condemn the acreage controls in agriculture as being excessively distorting, following up Becker's in- sight, my central thesis is that acreage controls render the target price a more efficient redistributive mechanism.For the sake of readers who are not familiar with the U.

farm support policies, 1 provide a short summary of the farm commodity program structure, which is a combination of a target price, acreage reduction, and loan rate programs.The target price is the mechanism that routes the most money to farmers.The government pays farmers who participate in feed grain, wheat, rice, and upland cotton pro- grams a deficiency payment multiplied by the eligible production.

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The deficiency payment is the difference between a target price and the market price or a loan rate, whichever (difference) is smaller.

In order to be eligible for deficiency payments, participating farmers must idle land as required by the acreage reduction program.More specifically, there is an acreage base for each crop that is determined by the 5-year moving average of acres planted to, and acres idled in association with, the specific crop   links 01 08 06 2 07 login articles support 05 keygen article 04 03 help events archive 02 register en forum software downloads 3 security 13 category 4 content 14 main 15 press media templates services icons resources info profile 16 2004 18 docs contactus html features files 20 21 5 22 page 6 misc 19 partners 24 terms  .More specifically, there is an acreage base for each crop that is determined by the 5-year moving average of acres planted to, and acres idled in association with, the specific crop.

If a participating farmer has wheat base acres of 100 and the acreage reduction program is 20 percent, then the farmer is permitted to plant only 80 acres to wheat.government stabilizes the market, both domestically and abroad, by purchasing commodities for stocks at the loan rate when crops are exceptionally good and selling commodities from its stocks 586 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY when crops are exceptionally poor.government subsidizes substantial stockholdings.The model that I am about to develop as- sumes that the public stockholding policy stabilizes short-run price variations.

In the past the loan rate had been set frequently at levels that led to net accumulation of large public stocks.Presently there is a moderate net accumulation of U.government stocks that help minimize worldwide commodity price variations.

The cost of this pub- lic stockholding should be attributed to foreign policy considerations rather than to income redistribution objectives.

Accordingly, in what follows the loan rate program is ignored.Redistribution Efficiency and Two Policy Instruments: The Cobb-Douglas Case Before presenting the detailed argument for my central thesis, namely, that the acreage control program renders the target price a more efficient redistributive mechanism, I present a short summary of why target price programs are more efficient than output control programs: First, theoretically, consider restricting output to a level smaller than the competitive output, thus raising the price from Po to atively, consider setting a target price at the same shown by Gardner (1983), the amount transferred under the produc- tion control is smaller than the amount transferred under the target price, yet the deadweight loss is the same for the two alternatives.' Second, it is hard, if not impossible, to enforce production controls when stochastic weather is a major factor of production.Stigler's axiom of human behavior "that all agreements whose violation would be profitable to the violator must be enforced" (1964, p.

Note, however, the exception of the farm tobacco program, which relies on output ~ontrols.~ The traditional farm sector model can be summarized by the fol- lowing simple functionproduction function: Q = KAaBP; (1) ' Gardner (1983) draws linear supply and demand curves; hence the two deadweight loss triangles have the same area.

It is safe to assume that nonlinearity would not change this result significantly.The combination of price support with an acreage control program for tobacco lasted for almost three decades, and then it was changed to an output control program.This change may have resulted from the crudity of the support price that failed to provide appropriate price relationships by tobacco quality.As expected, the result was high yields per acre of low-quality tobacco.This model is similar to Gisser's (1967) model.

Floyd's (1965) article is a noted exception to the tradition.Floyd presented several models of the effects of price sup- ports, acreage restrictions, and marketing controls on the returns to land and labor.

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He considered elasticities of substitution other than unity.demand for final output: Q = HP9; (2) value of the marginal product of input A: Pa = P (a 3-, (3) where B represents land, perfectly inelastic in supply, and A encom- passes all other inputs perfectly elastic in supply.The symbols Q, P, and Pa stand for agricultural output, its price, and the price of input A Need to purchase an ethnicity studies dissertation cheap 14 pages / 3850 words Academic American 3 hours.

The symbols Q, P, and Pa stand for agricultural output, its price, and the price of input A.

The symbols K, H, q,a, and P represent, respectively, the shift in the production function, the (horizontal) shift in the demand for output, the price elasticity of demand for final output, and the expo- nents of inputs A and B in the Cobb-Douglas production function.Assuming constant returns to scale implies that a + P = 1 Book Phs Bulletin Digital Library codecantor.Assuming constant returns to scale implies that a + P = 1.The parameters H and K are held equal to unity throughout the analysis.

Finally, Pa = a throughout the analysis, so the agricultural sector faces a horizontal supply curve of A with a vertical intercept of a.Notice that in this model the change in rent is captured entirely by returns to land because, as demonstrated by agricultural economists, while the supply of land is extremely inelastic, the supply of labor to the farm sector is extremely elastic.On the basis of their estimate of the labor supply elasticity, Rosine and Helmberger (1974) concluded that the lion's share of benefits to farmers from farm programs-93 percent in 1970-accrued to land, not to labor.Let P and B denote the target price and restricted acreage, respec- tively." Given the traditional Cobb- Douglas model, if an acreage control is added to a target price as a second policy instrument, the redistribution formula becomes APS = P(P"PB -I), (4) where PS is the producer surplus, APS is the change in rent to farm- ers, P > 1, and B < 1.We are now ready to discuss the conditions under which, given the political forces, acreage control programs enhance redistribution efficiency.

Figure 1 serves as the focus of the analysis in this and the following sections.Figure la depicts the domestic market and figure lb the $1 Unit FIG.-Target price and acreage control: a, the domestic farm market; b, the foreign farm market.Figure lb is relevant because trade has become in- creasingly important to the U.To anticipate, if we assume an elastic demand for the final output coupled with a unitary elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs, then re- stricting land in addition to a target price program would result in a less efficient transfer to the farm sector.If the demand is inelastic, idling land may render the target price program more efficient, de- pending on the proportion of the commodity exported.

Consider an agricultural commodity such as wheat or corn.In fig- ure la, So and D, denote the domestic supply and demand curves, respectively.Curve Do is the domestic plus the rest-of-the-world ex- cess demand.In figure lb, the rest-of-the-world supply and demand curves are denoted by S, and D,, respectively.

For example, at a price P:, ML in figure la equals MIL' in figure lb, which is Qd, 4;.

In a free market, with no government intervention, equilibrium would be determined at point L, where supply curve So intersects with demand curve Do.Suppose that the government implements a price support program by setting a target price Bo,inducing farmers to produce 4, that clears the market at a price Po.

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Then the difference between the target price and the market-clearing price is the deficiency payment to producers.Before we proceed, an important point should be stressed.129), when the price risks are reduced by a government target price program farmers do produce more than they would for the same average price in a free market %O Includes all 13 episodes of the first season. A look at members of a dysfunctional family that operates a funeral home in Pasadena. With the elder son returning home for the holidays to shattering news, the family must learn to deal with a death of their own, while figuring out how to go ahead with the business of the  .129), when the price risks are reduced by a government target price program farmers do produce more than they would for the same average price in a free market.

Suppose that the policymakers contemplate raising the target price from Poto P, and reducing acreage from B = 1 to B < 1, such that the transfer in equation (4) is held constant.In figure la, this change in the mix of the two instruments is traced out by a movement from point I to joint J.Curve PS, which crosses through these two points, is the isotransfer curve.

In general, curve PS is a locus of points satisfying the condition that the producer surplus, PS, is held constant.) Increasing the target price and idling additional acres along the PS curve result in a cost to the taxpayer, denoted by T, a benefit (or loss) to consumers- the change in the consumer surplus-denoted by ACS, and a benefit to producers, denoted by APS nbd-dhofar.com/essay/best-website-to-order-a-college-dietetics-essay-us-letter-size-ph-d-oxford.

) Increasing the target price and idling additional acres along the PS curve result in a cost to the taxpayer, denoted by T, a benefit (or loss) to consumers- the change in the consumer surplus-denoted by ACS, and a benefit to producers, denoted by APS.

The cost of the transfer to society, the deadweight loss, is T -ACS -APS.By definition, APS is held con- stant along curve PS.The unfavorable change in the consumer sur- plus, ACS, increases as one moves up along curve PS.The larger exports are as a proportion of total production, the smaller the effect of the change in the consumer surplus on domestic welfare.The change in T is crucial to our argument because PS and Do may be considered the government's buying curve and selling curve, respec- tively.

For example, at point J on the isotransfer curve, the cost to taxpayers may be viewed as P,Q, -P1Q,.If PS is elastic and Do is inelastic, climbing up curve PS by raising the target price and idling more acres must result in a smaller T.Some mathematical manipulation leads to an expression of the transfer cost to taxpayers in terms of the two policy instruments (P and B) as follows (App.A): The gain to all consumers (ACS)-domestic and in the rest of the world-is the consumer surplus, which in figure la is the area PtLGP,.The gain to domestic consumers equals (1 -E)ACS, where E is the exports as a proportion of total production (e.

The price along the demand curve is expressed as P = (P"'PB)"" (App.The gain to domestic consumers is then 5g0 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Substituting from equations (6), (7), and (4), we obtain the dead- weight loss equation as follows: loss = T -ACS -APS Along curve PS, the transfer (APS) and the producer surplus are held constant.

Formally, PS = PP"~B, resulting in an expression B = PSIPP"P.Substituting this expression in equation (8), we obtain where G = (PS/P)('+"'Y Differentiating equation (9) with respect to P yields Since E is positive and smaller than one, if demand curve Do is elastic, the expression (E + q) lq must be positive.Hence tracing the PS curve in the northwesterly direction by increasing P (and decreasing B) may result in only a higher social cost for a given fixed transfer.Equation (10) is particularly useful when demand curve Dois inelastic, rendering the expression (E + q)lq negative only when E exceeds the absolute value of q.Exports of agricultural commodities have become increasingly im- portant since the mid-1950s.

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In terms of equation (10)) given an in- elastic demand for farm output, a rising export proportion of total production might render the acreage reduction program a desirable policy instrument for lowering the cost of redistribution.Acreage diversion programs started in the mid-1950s.The coincidence of rising exports and acreage diversion supports the efficient-redis- tribution hypothesis How to get a custom writing assistance ethnicity studies dissertation Junior ASA 6 hours American.The coincidence of rising exports and acreage diversion supports the efficient-redis- tribution hypothesis.

There are, however, empirical problems associ- ated with the demand elasticity.Rosine and Helmberger (1974) im- plied that the demand for farm output was extremely inelastic, but they did not estimate it directly directory list 2 3 big txt Copyright 2007 James Fisher This work nbsp.

Rosine and Helmberger (1974) im- plied that the demand for farm output was extremely inelastic, but they did not estimate it directly.

Gardner (1987) estimated an elastic demand for feed grains (not including corn), wheat, and rice and an inelastic demand for corn and cotton.Table 1 presents Gardner's price elasticities and the export ratios of the five major agricultural crops for the time period 1984-88.224, which is smaller than its estimated elasticity of 0.75; likewise, the export ratio of cotton is 0.

412, which TABLE 1 * Sorghum, barley, and oats.is smaller than its estimated price elasticity of 0.It thus seems that an explanation for land reduction programs must rest with more realistic assumptions concerning the substitutability between land and all other inputs.

The Impact of the Elasticity of Substitution on the Isotransfer Curve: a # 0 The analysis in the previous section rests on the assumption that a = 1.The noted exception to this Cobb-Douglas tradition is Floyd's (1965) model, in which the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs was used.Twenty-five years after Floyd published his study, I am reluctantly abandoning the Cobb-Douglas convenience.Simply put, the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution is too restrictive.

Equation (11) states that the producer surplus expressed as total sales less payments to all nonland inputs (PS) is held constant along curve PS.Equation (12) states that input A, encompassing all nonland inputs, is employed up to the point at which its value of the marginal product equals the price of A.Of the four unknowns, P and B are policy instruments.Since the system contains three equations in four unknowns, determining B simultaneously determines P.Geometrically the question is, Would QP increase or decrease as one moves upward along curve PS? The solution (see App.B) to the three equations above is and Recalling that u = l/(p + 1) and differentiating QP with respect to B, we obtain If u > 1, then the derivative of QP with respect to B is negative, implying that idling more acres would increase QP, which renders the transfer more costly.

On the other hand, if u < 1, the derivative of QP with respect to B is positive, implying that idling more acres would decrease QP, which renders the transfer less costly.We saw in the previous section that if u equals unity, acreage con- trol would make the redistribution programs more efficient if the price elasticity of the demand for final farm output is not only smaller than one but also smaller than the ratio of exports to the total value of output, a very unlikely coincidence because of the positive relation- ship between exports and the demand price elasticity.Thus the value of acreage control as a supplement to target price programs depends critically on the size of u relative to unity.

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Empirical studies are helpful in determining the order of magni- tude of a.Binswanger (1974) estimated the partial elasticities of sub- stitution between land and other inputs-labor, machinery, and fer- tilizer-at 0.

He estimated the elasticity of substitution between machinery and labor at 0 Write me a college ethnicity studies dissertation Premium Undergrad double spaced 24 hours.He estimated the elasticity of substitution between machinery and labor at 0.

The small elasticity of substitution between land and labor and the large elasticity of substitution between land and fertilizer are expected.Binswanger was surprised to find that machinery was a better substi- tute for land than for labor.For the time period 1930-80, they estimated the shares of labor, machinery, land, and fertilizer at 0.They also estimated the cross-elasticity of substitution between land and fertilizer at 1.296 and between either land and machinery or land and labor at 0 how to order a anatomy lab report Custom writing College Sophomore 12 hours.

296 and between either land and machinery or land and labor at 0.

This result confirms the reasonable assumption that labor and ma- chinery are poor substitutes for land.The empirical estimates of Allen's (1956) elasticities of substitution, particularly by Kawagoe et al., lend support to the theoretical result that acreage control, as a supplementary tool to target price, reduces the deadweight losses per dollar transferred from taxpayers to farm- ers.To confirm once more that Allen's elasticity of substitution be- tween land and the aggregate of all other inputs is indeed smaller than unity, I utilized data taken from Hayami and Ruttan (1985, app.

c-2) in order to estimate the following equation relating output per acre to the price of land deflated by the price of farm output: or, alternatively, The results of estimating equation (17) are summarized in table 2.(1986), to account for the change in produc- tion structure over time, I specified two time dummies as dl, which is one before 1930 and zero after, and d,, which is zero before 1930 and one after.The coefficients of the time variables are relatively large because the data are quinquennial.The regression coefficient of ln(P,IP,), which is an estimate of the value of a, has a value of 0.

164), and it is significant with a t-ratio of 2.After adjustment for autocorrelation, this regres- sion coefficient drops to 0.

1 1 with a t-ratio slightly higher than 1.164 is selected as the most conservative estimate of the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs.Such a small a assures us that acreage control programs would probably reduce the taxpayer cost per dollar transferred to the farm sector if the demand for farm output is price elastic and would definitely reduce it if the demand is price inelastic.

However, the savings to taxpayers should be weighed against the loss to consumers, who must TABLE 2 REGRESSION FOR EQUATION FUNCTION(United States, 1880-1980 Quinquennial Observations) ESTIMATES (17): THE FARM-CES PRODUCTION Sounc~.a, U5; and output (defined as "all crops") from ser.-t-ratios of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses.pay higher prices when acreage controls are coupled with target price programs.

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It seems that since the mid-1950s, as less land has been available for the process of agricultural production, farmers have increased the use of fertilizer.The decrease in land availability induced farmers to use less labor and machinery, a process that is not revealed to the naked eye because of the substitution of machinery for expensive labor.Had it not been for acreage controls, the use of farm machinery would have grown at a faster rate Translation-based corpus studies : contrasting English and Portuguese tense and aspect systems /Diana Santos.   War and words : horror and heroism in the literature of warfare /edited by Sara Munson Deats, Lagretta Tallent Lenker, and Merry G. Perry. Response   Giving academic presentations /Susan M. Reinhart..

Had it not been for acreage controls, the use of farm machinery would have grown at a faster rate.

The data shown in table 3, which are taken from Hayami and Ruttan (1985), confirm these casual ob- servations.Since the share of fertilizer is relatively small, acreage controls, subject to keeping the transfer fixed, resulted in substantial cost saving on account of economizing on labor and machinery, and relatively small cost increases on account of using more fertili~er .Since the share of fertilizer is relatively small, acreage controls, subject to keeping the transfer fixed, resulted in substantial cost saving on account of economizing on labor and machinery, and relatively small cost increases on account of using more fertili~er.~ Finally, if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs has been as low as the results in table 2 suggest, then the share of land in agricultural output should have at least stayed constant and perhaps increased over time .~ Finally, if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs has been as low as the results in table 2 suggest, then the share of land in agricultural output should have at least stayed constant and perhaps increased over time.The data in table 3 show that the share of land has increased from 15.The combined share of labor and machinery has fallen from 79.Thus the data in table 3 lend support to a low elasticity of substitution between land and all other input

The following section shows that if we are willing to accept a low estimate of the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs, then in the time period 1984-88 acreage controls substantially reduced the social cost of the U.The Impact of Acreage Controls on the Transfer Cost When a < 1 and Is Small Table 4, which was mentioned earlier, contains a summary of relevant market statistics for the time period 1984-88 of the five major ag- ricultural crops.The results of estimating the gains and losses associ- ated with the redistribution of income are presented in table 5.These results are expressed as a percentage of the market value of output.Columns 1-4 present the estimates of gains and losses due to the acreage diversion program.

Columns 5-8 present the gains and losses under the assumption that the target price is not coupled with acreage The reader is reminded that the 7.2 percent fertilizer share in 1980 refers to total agricultural output, not just crop output."The referee of this paper commented that it is hard to believe that the share of power and machinery should exceed that of land.Note, however, that the insight from table 3 is obtained from reading columns, not rows.

TABLE 3 SHARE INPUIs ----Output Land Fertilizer Labor Machinery Index YEAR (lo6 ha) (lo3 Tons) (lo6 Hours) Land Fert~lizer Labor Machinery (1880 = 100) 1940 452 1,542 20,457 56,778 18.2 6 2 26 8 39 8 350 1980 427 20,799 4,000 279,271 32.